TY  - GEN
N2  - The success of global climate policies over the coming decades depends on the diffusion of 'green' technologies. This requires that international environmental agreements (IEAs) and trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs) interact productively.Using a simple and tractable model, we highlight the strategic reduction in abatement commitments on account of a hold-up effect. In anticipation of rent extraction by the innovator signatories might abate less than non-signatories turning the IEA 'brown'. Self-enforcing IEAs have fewer signatories and diffusion can reduce global abatement under TRIPs. Countries hosting patent holders extract rents from TRIPs, but may be better off without them.
T3  - Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
KW  - International climate policy; diffusion of innovations; intellectual property rights; hold-up problem.
TI  - The Climate Policy Hold-Up: Green Technologies,Intellectual Property Rights, and the Abatement Incentives of International Agreements 
A1  - Goeschl, Timo
A1  - Perino, Grischa
AV  - public
CY  - Heidelberg
EP  - 25
ID  - heidok18633
UR  - https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/18633/
Y1  - 2015/04//
ER  -